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Abstract 
Illegal markets differ from legal markets in many respects. Although illegal markets 
have economic significance and are of theoretical importance, they have been largely 
ignored by economic sociology. In this article we propose a categorization for illegal 
markets and highlight reasons why certain markets are outlawed. We perform a com-
prehensive review of the literature to characterize illegal markets along the three coordi-
nation problems of value creation, competition, and cooperation. The article concludes 
by appealing to economic sociology to strengthen research on illegal markets and by 
suggesting areas for future empirical research.
Zusammenfassung
Illegale Märkte unterscheiden sich in vielerlei Hinsicht von legalen Märkten. Trotz ih-
res großen wirtschaftlichen Gewichts und ihrer theoretischen Bedeutung blieben sie 
in der Wirtschaftssoziologie bislang weitgehend unbeachtet. Dieses Papier schlägt eine 
Kategorisierung illegaler Märkte vor und diskutiert die Gründe für ihr Verbot. Auf der 
Grundlage einer umfassenden Literaturauswertung werden die Strukturmerkmale il-
legaler Märkte anhand der drei Koordinierungsprobleme der Wertbildung, des Wett-
bewerbs und der Kooperation dargestellt. Das Papier schließt mit Empfehlungen für 
zukünftige empirische Forschung.
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In the Shadow: Illegal Markets and Economic Sociology
Research into markets is at the center of economic sociology (Fligstein 2001; White 
1981; Zelizer 1979). Over the past three decades sociologists have investigated almost 
every type of market using a variety of theoretical premises. All this research, however, 
starts from an assumption of the legality of market exchange. Economic sociology has 
given no attention to illegal markets. 
This is not only an important lacuna in economic sociology. Illegal markets are also a 
phenomenon of great economic, political, and social significance. Although estimates 
of the size of illegal markets are notoriously difficult to make – actors do not publish 
revenue and profit figures – existing estimates indicate that annual revenues on illegal 
markets may well surpass one trillion dollars.1 Politically, the existence of illegal mar-
kets presents state and law enforcement agencies with significant challenges. Socially, 
illegal markets are important because of the challenge they pose to the moral order of 
societies. 
A lack of attention to illegal markets also means economic sociology neglects theoreti-
cal insights which might be gained from their study. Ignoring illegal markets excludes 
an important source of variance from the study into markets, thereby hampering theo-
retical advances also into the understanding of legal markets. Illegality deprives actors 
of legal protection from the property rights provided by the state for legal market trans-
actions, and limits the business strategies and organizational forms available to actors. 
We are deeply indebted to Renate Mayntz for her thoughtful input to this article through many con-
versations and her detailed comments on earlier drafts. Many thanks also to Matías Dewey and Paola 
De Vivo for their comments on an earlier draft.
1 Authors working in the field and public institutions such as the UNODC (United Nations Of-
fice on Drugs and Crime) have tried to assess the size of illegal markets. All the figures must 
be read with great caution, however. The wide margins of estimates alone shows their impre-
cision. The estimates at the upper end are often challenged by other researchers, arguing that 
the figures are widely exaggerated. It is generally believed that the drug market is the largest 
illegal market. The UNODC estimated its worldwide revenue to be $322 billion in 2003 at the 
retail level (UNODC 2005: 17). Another especially large market is believed to be the trade in 
counterfeit and pirated products for which worldwide revenue of $250 billion was estimated 
for 2007 (OECD 2009: 1). For the United States the stakes in illegal sports betting have been 
estimated at $380 billion (Smith/Wynne/Hartnagel 2003: 10). Other markets are much smaller 
but may nevertheless comprise a substantial part of the trade in the product. It is estimated that 
the revenue from transactions involving stolen or counterfeit art are worth between $2 and 6 
billion (Bernick 1998: 106), which would amount to up to 20 percent of the total market. It is 
also estimated that about 10 percent of the worldwide market for medication consists of fake 
medication (Cockburn et al. 2005: 302). For an overview of the assessments of the size of vari-
ous illegal markets see Wehinger (2011).
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What are the consequences arising from a lack of legal protection for market actors, 
from the threat of legal prosecution of market participants due to their market activi-
ties, and from the absence of social legitimacy for exchange? Answering such questions 
by investigating illegal markets helps us to understand more fully the significance of the 
role of the protection of property rights in the operation of markets.
The purpose of this article is mainly exploratory and conceptual. Its aim is to provide 
economic sociology with a basis for empirical research by conceptually categorizing il-
legal markets and suggesting research questions that might be especially promising. In 
a first step we define illegal markets and determine the conditions for their emergence. 
This is followed by an attempt to systematize the different dimensions of illegality in 
market exchange. What does it mean to say that a market is illegal? Subsequently, we 
discuss justifications for the illegality of certain market activities. Why are some mar-
kets illegal? In the following part we use the existing literature on illegal markets from 
criminology, sociology, anthropology, and economics, to outline the most important 
properties of illegal market structures and operations. To ensure the link to economic 
sociology we will describe the operations of illegal markets on the basis of theoretical 
advances from the analysis of legal markets in economic sociology. Special attention is 
given to the role of networks and institutions, as well as the three essential coordination 
problems of valuation, competition, and cooperation (Beckert 2009). The conceptual-
ization of illegal markets under the terms of legal market research, gives access to sys-
tematic differences in the functioning of markets operating illegally. In the final part of 
the article we highlight the research questions arising from our considerations. These 
provide a basis for further study into illegal markets.
1 Illegal markets
Markets are arenas of regular voluntary exchange of goods or services for money under 
conditions of competition (Aspers/Beckert 2008). The exchange of goods or services 
does not constitute a market when the exchange takes place only very irregularly and 
when there is no competition either on the demand side or on the supply side. Markets 
are illegal when either the product itself, the exchange of it, or the way in which it is 
produced or sold violates legal stipulations. What makes a market illegal is therefore 
entirely dependent on a legal definition. When a market is defined as illegal, the state 
declines the protection of property rights, does not define and enforce standards for 
product quality, and can prosecute the actors within it. Not every criminal economic 
activity constitutes an illegal market; the product or service demanded may be too spe-
cific for competition to emerge, or it may simply be business fraud. Since illegality is 
defined by law, what constitutes an illegal market differs between legal jurisdictions and 
over time. The comparative and historical variance of illegal markets is itself a pertinent 
sociological research topic within the field. 
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What illegal markets share with legal markets is that they come into existence only when 
there is supply and demand for the goods offered. However, for an illegal market to 
emerge, other conditions must be met. On the demand side, a legal market either does 
not exist or the goods illegally offered are cheaper than the ones offered legally, while at 
the same time the purchaser is willing to discount the moral costs and (potential) risks 
arising from the illegality of the purchase. On the supply side, illegal markets depend on 
their expected profitability for the supplier, but also on his financial and organizational 
capacities to produce and/or distribute the good and evade law enforcement. Like the 
purchaser, the supplier must be willing to overcome any scruples associated with the 
illegality of his activities.
Strictly speaking, the notion of illegal markets is rather loose. The phenomena covered 
under the notion of illegal markets are heterogeneous and also comprise markets that 
are, as such, legal but involve a high level of illegal activities. Indeed, most illegal activity 
on markets actually takes place within the confines of a market which is as such legal. 
In many instances the legality of the market itself is even an important condition for 
the unfolding and success of illegal activities. Due to the multifaceted character of phe-
nomena of illegality in markets it is not possible to distinguish illegal markets simply in 
terms of the products traded on them. Instead, close reading of the existing literature 
on illegal markets (Wehinger 2011) makes it apparent that different forms of illegal 
markets must be distinguished. 
To clarify the different forms of illegality on markets we present a typology which dis-
tinguishes illegality along four different dimensions: (1) illegality due to the outlawing 
of specific products; (2) illegality of the market exchange of an otherwise legal product; 
(3) illegality of exchange due to theft or product forgery; and (4) illegality due to the 
violation of regulatory stipulations.
1. One instance in which one can rightfully speak of illegal markets is the market ex-
change of products whose production or provision is as such illegal. Current examp-
les are child pornography, child prostitution, forced labor, illegal drugs, and human 
trafficking. Production or provision of these products and services is forbidden and 
therefore any market exchange emerging for these goods constitutes an illegal mar-
ket, when the necessary conditions for the existence of a market are fulfilled. 
2. A second type of illegal market refers to products or services which are as such legal 
but whose exchange on markets is outlawed. The focus here is on the market ex-
change, which is seen as offensive. An example of this is markets for body parts for 
transplantation purposes. In the United States, as in almost all other countries, the 
law stipulates that it “shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive 
or transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplan-
tation” (U.S. National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, quoted from Roth [2007: 45]). 
In a similar vein the illegality of prostitution (in some countries) is not a stipulation 
against sexual relations but against the intrusion of monetary considerations into 
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such relations. To the extent a market for the exchange of these goods nevertheless 
develops, one can correctly call it an illegal market. 
3. Thirdly, market exchange of products can be illegal because the product offered has 
been stolen or has been forged. The market exchange for such products differs from 
the first two types because the production of the good itself is legal and legal ob-
jections do not refer to the exchange of goods from this product category as such. 
A painting that has been stolen is not as such illegal. With regard to counterfeits, 
producing them for private purposes in most instances does not constitute an illegal 
activity. The market exchange of stolen or forged products, however, is illegal. Ne-
vertheless, this exchange does not necessarily constitute a market in itself. Stolen or 
counterfeit art, for instance, is fraudulently sold through galleries or auction houses 
otherwise dealing with non-stolen and authentic artworks (Tijhuis 2006: 163). It is 
important to recognize this because the market value of stolen or counterfeit pro-
ducts depends on camouflaging their true properties. This can succeed only if the 
exchange takes place in a legal market in which at least the customer is not aware 
that the product is either stolen or counterfeit. However, the exchange can also take 
place under conditions where both parties are aware of the theft or the forgery and 
thereby takes place in an illegal market. Examples are informal counterfeit markets 
such as La Salada in Buenos Aires or the Xiushui Market in Beijing where merchants 
sell clothing with forged labels and the vendors and customers are fully aware of this 
(Chaudhry/Zimmerman 2009: 42). 
4. Finally, illegality on markets can refer to the violation of legal stipulations in the 
production process. Examples of this are the employment of illicit labor, the illegal 
disposal of toxic waste, or the violation of safety standards. Such violations of the 
law do not necessarily constitute outright illegal markets (they may, however, form 
illegal segments of the market). Nevertheless they are important features of illegality 
because the practices are forbidden due to their consequences for the market or for 
society. The reduction of costs through illegal elements in the production process, 
often through the externalization of these costs, leads to competitive distortions. 
The result is a mixed market with a smaller or larger illegal share.
Obviously, there are different degrees of outlawing market exchange: from banning 
whole product categories to forbidding only certain forms of production or exchange. 
This indicates that societies find market exchanges objectionable for different reasons 
and that the violation of social norms through certain market exchanges is not seen as al-
ways demanding the same legal reaction. But what makes a market socially objectionable? 
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2 Why are some markets illegal?
At least from the perspective of standard economic theory the fact that some markets 
are illegal must be unexpected. If markets provide benefits to the parties involved they 
should exist. Hence, a question which immediately suggests itself on observing the il-
legality of some markets concerns why they are illegal. The “why” does not refer to the 
explanation of causality but rather to the justifications provided for legal stipulations 
prohibiting certain market exchanges. This includes legal stipulations whose violation 
does not constitute an illegal market in its own right but constitutes a legal defect in the 
production or exchange of the goods (see section 3). 
Understanding the normative reasons for declaring markets or specific practices on mar-
kets illegal is increasingly being discussed in practical philosophy (Kanbur 2004; Satz 
2010; Walzer 1983). This literature focuses on normative justifications for restrictions of 
market exchange. While the criminological, historical, and sociological literature on the 
legal blockage of markets also discusses reasons for illegality (Healy 2006; Steiner 2010; 
Zelizer 1979) it is in the normative debates of practical philosophy that these reasons are 
outlined systematically. This literature is concerned mainly with two of the market types 
distinguished above: prohibitions on the production of specific products (type 1) and 
the legal restrictions on exchanging certain products on markets (type 2). 
The normative arguments mentioned for justifying the outlawing of certain markets refer 
to values other than economic efficiency. To the extent that these values empirically pro-
vide the justification for the prohibition of certain markets, it furnishes evidence of the 
entrance of non-economic values into the sphere of economic exchange. Already in the 
1980s Michael Walzer (1983: 156 ff.) developed a list of goods for which market exchange 
should be blocked. In this (unsystematic) list Walzer includes slavery, the purchase of 
political and civil rights, the purchase of salvation, love, and honors, as well as “desperate 
exchanges” in which one of the parties to the exchange is highly susceptible. More recent-
ly, Debra Satz (2010) suggested a taxonomy listing four conditions under which market 
exchange becomes normatively offensive and should perhaps be blocked. The typology 
distinguishes between individually or socially harmful consequences of the market, on 
the one hand, and certain properties of the agents in the market, on the other. An exam-
ple of individually harmful consequences of markets is food markets in which the price 
level leads to malnutrition for some. An example of socially harmful consequences are 
“markets that operate to undermine the capacities that a person needs to claim her rights 
or to participate in society” (Satz 2010: 95). Illegal markets (like others) can have both 
types of consequences: illegal drugs can have negative effects on their consumers and can 
clash with the social values of the majority. Markets are also morally objectionable when 
some actors on the market have “very weak or highly asymmetric knowledge and agency” 
(Satz 2010: 96), as well as when the market is characterized by the extreme vulnerability 
of one of the contracting parties. This applies to most illegal markets. 
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These harmful outcomes of markets and conditions for actors do not justify automati-
cally the prohibition of the market. Instead, the implications of possible prohibition 
must be normatively reflected upon as well – including the likely emergence of illegal 
markets – and weighed against the possibilities of achieving normatively superior out-
comes through market regulation: in other words, the prohibition of certain practices 
and methods instead of complete prohibition of a given market. Empirical evidence 
to justify the prohibition of markets shows the significance of the normative consider-
ations listed by Debra Satz. Studies on the prohibition of markets for gambling (Lutter 
2010), illegal drugs (Seddon 2010), diamonds (Bieri 2010), alcohol (Mendelson 2009), 
prostitution (Hunt 1999), and human organs (Steiner 2010) show that these normative 
considerations stand front and center when markets are prohibited. When establishing 
legal barriers to market exchange, societies make social values economically relevant 
through the prohibition of markets considered noxious (Satz 2010), obnoxious (Kan-
bur 2004), or repugnant (Roth 2007).
However, it is not possible to comprehend the illegality of markets only on the basis of 
moral justifications. Next to social values, the prohibition of certain markets or specific 
practices on markets can also be motivated by economic considerations, with reference 
to the efficient functioning of markets and the protection of the interests of market 
participants. Such objections to certain practices are not primarily the concern of dis-
cussions within practical philosophy but rather the subject of the literature on market 
regulation. Economic considerations stand front and center in the outlawing of the 
market exchange of stolen and counterfeit products but also in the prohibition of cer-
tain practices in the production process. Allowing trade in stolen products would not 
only be a violation of the property rights of the owner of the product but would provide 
incentives for stealing, leading to an increase in transaction costs. Banning counter-
feits from the market protects the intellectual property rights of the original creator 
or the owner of the trademark (for example, fake medication), secures the working of 
the monetary system (counterfeit money), and the signaling-value of certificates. The 
enforcement of legal regulation concerning the production process not only defends 
values – for instance, those of child development or environmental protection – but 
also prevents welfare losses from monopolies, information asymmetries, and nega-
tive external effects. On the consumer side, the prosecution of the market exchange for 
goods that evade product regulation – for instance, fake medication – serves to protect 
purchasers from potentially hazardous goods (Akunyili/Nnani 2004) and thereby al-
lows anonymous mass markets to develop. The prohibition of illicit work protects the 
interest of the state in tax revenues. 
This very sketchy summary shows that definitions of legality and illegality on markets 
are also part of a “market struggle” (Weber 1978: 72) in which actors try to secure 
their material and ideal interests. Normative, functional, and economic interest-based 
justifications for the prohibition of certain products, market exchanges, or production 
practices are not mutually exclusive. All three can be relevant simultaneously, as in the 
prohibition of slavery (Berwanger 1967) and child labor (López-Calva 2003: 256). 
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3 The operation of illegal markets
Given the heterogeneity of phenomena of illegality on markets it is not possible to de-
scribe the functioning of illegal markets in a general model. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to identify more general traits of illegal markets by analyzing existing criminological, 
sociological, economic, and historical research on illegal markets from a theoretically 
informed perspective. 
To systematize the understanding of the functioning of illegal markets we make use of a 
typology developed in market sociology which proceeds from the identification of a set 
of three coordination problems that confront market actors and need to be resolved for 
markets to operate (Beckert 2009). This is a general approach to markets that can also 
guide the study of illegal markets because actors on illegal markets are also confronted 
with these coordination problems. However, efforts to resolve them are subject to vari-
ous challenges due to the illegality of their activities and different solutions must be 
sought. Illegality, it will be demonstrated, leads to different and often very cumbersome 
structures in markets. The typology thus allows us to understand the structures and 
operation of illegal markets by contrasting them to legal markets.
The typology of coordination problems is anchored in the postulation that for markets 
to operate, uncertainty in market transactions must be reduced in several dimensions. 
Market actors need “stable worlds” (Fligstein 2001) or “calculability” (Weber 1978: 351) 
in order for role sets to be reproduced. This holds true for markets under conditions of 
legality and illegality. The uncertainty in markets derives from three principal coordina-
tion problems, concerning value, competition, and cooperation. 
1. The problem of value refers, first, to the assignment of value to a certain category 
of goods (for instance, cars, wine, travel) and second, to the assignment of different 
values to heterogeneous products within the same market. Purchasers must be able 
to “discriminate between the worth of goods or services that confront them in the 
market” (Koçak 2003: 5). The basis for this is a process of classification and com-
mensuration in which actors rank products according to their contribution to the 
fulfillment of a functional need or within a status order of goods (Beckert/Aspers 
2011) and thus provide the basis for attaching value to products in relation to each 
other. To establish the value of a product, actors must be able to assess its qualities. 
2. Secondly, to ensure profits, suppliers must create market structures that provide 
protection from (price) competition. In legal markets this is the outcome of market 
struggles between suppliers, the state, and intermediaries, leading to cartelization, 
monopolization, product differentiation, first mover-advantages, entry barriers, and 
legal regulations structuring competition. In legal markets the state plays a key role 
in the market struggles from which the structures of competition emerge by laying 
down ground rules, for instance in competition law or intellectual property law, and 
by granting subsidies or collecting tariffs. 
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3. Thirdly, market actors are confronted with problems of cooperation emerging from 
the social risks of exchange, notably that of non-fulfillment of contract – in other 
words, “defection.” These risks arise from the asymmetric distribution of information 
regarding price, product quality and the possible opportunism of exchange partners 
in light of incomplete or non-enforceable contracts. The resolution of this problem 
is indispensable for profitable market transactions. On illegal markets this problem 
is especially pertinent because the protection of contracts by the state, which is the 
crucial protector of property rights on legal markets, is absent. On illegal markets 
actors must operate without and against the state (Paoli 2002: 145).
Value
Problems of value on illegal markets are to be found primarily among the difficulties 
of assessing product qualities, as well as the consequences of the legal defects for prices. 
The creation of value for a certain class of goods, a vital issue of competitive struggles 
on legal markets (Callon/Méadel/Rabeharisoa 2002), is largely irrelevant in illegal mar-
kets. Either the value is beyond doubt for the demander (for example, organ transplants, 
but also such things as child pornography or drugs) or illegal markets profit parasiti-
cally (Wehinger 2011) from the value construction on legal markets. The hindrance of 
advertisement and other marketing measures on illegal markets makes it difficult for 
suppliers to contribute actively to the creation of preferences. An exception may be the 
offering of free drugs to new customers on illegal drug markets (Coomber 2003: 469; 
Hobbs/Pearson 2004: 469). The curtailing of marketing instruments on illegal markets 
makes these markets more demand-driven than legal markets. 
Suppliers in illegal markets, however, make parasitic use of product value created by 
suppliers in legal markets. This holds true not only for the value given to a specific 
class of products but especially for the symbolic value associated with certain prod-
ucts (Wilcox/Kim/Sen 2009: 255). The status of luxury goods is established through 
the marketing activities and reputation of the manufacturer of the original product 
and parasitically exploited by the producer of the counterfeit, who neither incurs the 
marketing costs nor the same level of production costs – when quality standards for the 
counterfeit are, as is often the case (OECD 2008: 53), lower than for the original. 
While these are examples of the parasitic use of value categories originating in legal 
markets, the valuation of goods on illegal markets is at the same time confronted with 
pertinent problems of quality assessment which must be resolved by the market actors 
themselves. Problems of asymmetric distribution of information (Akerlof 1970) show 
up on illegal markets much more forcefully than on legal markets. While legally traded 
products are subject to quality regulations – such as safety regulations and quality stan-
dards – their illegally traded counterparts evade such regulations. At the same time, il-
legal markets are strictly limited as regards the provision of institutional safeguards to 
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their customers if the latter come to discover quality defects after purchase. There are 
no legally enforceable warranties. While customers can generally assume that the qual-
ity of counterfeit products is likely to be lower than that of the original, they can never 
know how much lower. Only for some products offered on illegal markets of type 4 are 
quality problems absent. An example is the illegal market for cigarettes in which a stan-
dardized product is sold but without paying the tax (Antonopoulos 2009). 
In terms of social consequences, customers’ lack of knowledge regarding product qual-
ity is relatively unproblematic in the case of counterfeit products such as clothing or 
watches. In the case of forged spare parts for aircraft maintenance, however, the con-
sequences can be severe. Counterfeit investment products such as forged art can in-
cur serious financial losses. The same holds true for the purchase of stolen goods in 
good faith if the seller is not able to recompense the buyer in case of detection. Severe 
consequences must also be expected in illegal markets of the other types. Illegal drugs 
(type 1) may not have the quality expected by the user (Caulkins 2007: 63); in illegal 
kidney transplantations (type 2) medical standards may be compromised (Goodwin 
2006: 189); counterfeited medicine (type 3) may be useless or harmful (Gaudiano et al. 
2007); toys sold by producers evading safety standards (type 4) may damage the health 
of children playing with them. 
One can assume that the absence of the mechanisms of quality assurance and enforce-
ability of product quality operational in legal markets is an important impediment to 
illegal markets by limiting market expansion and having negative effects on price. How 
do actors react to the information asymmetries? How do they assess the value of the 
products being offered? Research on illegal markets shows that suppliers attempt to 
provide specific devices to reduce uncertainty regarding product quality. This supports 
the claim that the coordination problem of valuation itself is as pertinent in illegal mar-
kets as it is in legal markets. The concrete mechanisms being used, however, differ due 
to the illegality of the transaction. 
A device of particular importance is personalized networks. In markets for illegal drugs, 
for instance, networks form between dealers and customers, allowing for an iterative 
game in which the dealer has an increased interest in providing a predictable quality 
of product in order to ensure ongoing business (May/Hough 2004). Reputational net-
works also play an important role (Coomber 2003: 947). In a study on the illegal online 
market for stolen bank account data, Holt and Lampe (2010) show the mechanisms 
through which product quality standards are maintained by means of self-regulation. 
Offers of false data are made public on the online trading platform, including the nam-
ing of the person who brought the product to the market. Sellers can lose their status 
of “verified” through the platform administrators and thereby lose their reputational 
capital. Personalized networks and reputation also play an important role on legal mar-
kets, of course (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1997). In illegal markets, however, their role is 
much more prominent because actors are much more limited in the types of devices 
available to them to prevent market failure from information asymmetry. The branding 
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of products on illegal markets, although confirmed in some instances (Wendel/Curtis 
2000: 230), is rather an exception and warranties would not be credible because of their 
non-enforceability in the juridical system. For these reasons actors are much more con-
fined to the use of personal networks. Middlemen, who are trusted by both sides, may 
also reduce uncertainty by brokering and intervening in transactions (Kenney 2007b: 
28; Zaitch 2002: 251). Sometimes, criminal groups are used as guarantors, stepping in if 
one side cheats the other (Gambetta 1993: 20). 
One can also show, however, that the problem of quality assessment does not necessar-
ily have to be resolved in illegal markets. The problem can also be shifted. Quality un-
certainty is dealt with by shifting risks from the original customer to a final user who is 
unaware of the legal defect of the product. In the construction of a subway the contrac-
tor may use inferior building materials, with the client being unaware of this violation 
of safety standards. In such instances, illegal market transactions of type 3 or type 4 can 
be connected to corruption: that is, the trading of decisions delegated by third parties 
(Dewey 2011). 
In addition, the uncertainty regarding product quality may be accepted by the customer 
either out of desperation or due to deliberate ignorance. Desperation can emerge either 
from a lack of an alternative legal market for the product (for example, organ trans-
plantation) or a lack of the financial means to buy the licit product (for example, fake 
medication). Deliberate ignorance can be expected if the value of the product emerges 
primarily from its symbolic qualities which are visible to the customer. The purchaser 
of a faked watch – who is aware of the fact that it is a counterfeit – may be more inter-
ested in the label than in the watch’s technical finesse. That status symbols are an easily 
recognizable characteristic for purchasers may be the main reason – besides the large 
difference between production costs and retail value – why those products in particular 
are offered illegally. 
An issue connected to the valuation of products is their pricing.2 Again, one can see that 
illegality has profound consequences for the operation of markets. Looking systemati-
cally at the factors influencing the price of products traded on illegal markets, two as-
pects stand out: Information and the existence of an alternative, legal market. 
If the customer knows about the legal defect of the product and there is an alternative 
legal market for the product category – that is, if the product is counterfeit,3 stolen, or 
produced under evasion of legal regulations – the product will be traded with a signifi-
cant discount to its legal counterpart. Stevenson (2001: 112) finds that stolen products 
are traded at between 14 and 38 percent of the regular selling price. The discount is even 
2 For the difference between value and price see Aspers/Beckert (2011).
3 Counterfeits can also constitute a type 2 market if there is no legal counterpart for the product. 
This holds true for the selling of forged documents. Here the argument for the pricing of coun-
terfeit products developed in this paragraph does not apply. 
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higher for more expensive goods and if large quantities are sold (Henry 1976: 795). In 
theoretical terms, one can also assume that the illegality discount for counterfeit prod-
ucts with legal alternatives depends also on the degree of moral scruple of potential 
buyers. The higher these scruples are, the more attractive the price must be for a trans-
action to take place (Marcketti/Shelley 2009). 
Whether there is a price difference at all, however, depends on the distribution of in-
formation. If the buyer is unaware that he is buying a stolen product, a counterfeit or 
a product produced by infringing legal rules, there will be no price discount and prof-
its are distributed among the suppliers (deceptive counterfeiting, Grossmann/Shapiro 
(1988: 80)). This can be observed in the art market, where unrecognized counterfeits 
are sold for the same price as authentic pieces by the artist.4 Given the importance of 
information for pricing (at least in type 3 and type 4 markets) suppliers do have an in-
terest in hiding the legal defects of their products. Investigating this camouflaging is an 
interesting topic in the study of illegal markets. Studies of markets for stolen products 
show that this process often involves several transactions, with the product becoming 
legitimated on the market through its association with vendors of increasingly legiti-
mate status (Aarons 2001: 29; Bogdanova 2011; Massy 2000: 141).
Prices on type 1 or type 2 markets are not influenced negatively by the existence of 
alternative markets and positively influenced by the illegal character of the transaction. 
The market for illegal drugs is one example of this. On a legal market, heroin or cocaine 
could be offered for a fraction of their current market price. Because the product is ille-
gal, the producer must protect himself from the risks of confiscation of the good or the 
production facilities and from personal prosecution. The persons involved must insure 
against these risks and take preventive measures which incur costs. Hence, the illegal 
market has high transaction costs. The consumer pays for a high profit margin justified 
by the high entrepreneurial risks involved in the production and vending of the product 
(Reuter/Kleiman 1986: 335) whereas suppliers earn a risk premium (Viscusi 1986: 338). 
The prohibition of a market for a product also reduces supply and therefore leads to 
higher prices (Levine 1991: 472; Saffer/Chaloupka 1999).5 
At the same time, the enforcement of prohibition rules imposes a considerable finan-
cial burden on the state, which may even outweigh the benefits of this policy (Miron/
Zwiebel 1995), and may have unintended consequences because even higher possible 
earnings after supply has been reduced could attract more criminals (McCoy 2000: 218; 
Levine 1991: 488). Furthermore, persecution in one region takes the pressure off crimi-
nal activities in other regions (Thoumi 2009: 210) and contradictory policies may open 
loopholes for sly entrepreneurs (Mendoza 2010a: 263). That products and services re-
4 See the recent scandal involving the auctioning of a Heinrich Campendonk painting which later 
turned out to be a fake for 2.8 Million euros by a German auction house.
5 However, at least for organs to be used for transplantation this is contested on the basis of 
crowding out effects (Healy 2006; Titmuss 1970).
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main outlawed despite the costs deriving from this policy must be explained by their 
normative offensiveness. 
For some illegal markets – for example, illegal drugs – there is a political debate on 
whether they should be transposed into regulated legal markets due to the negative 
social effects of their illegal operation or because of the potential tax income for the 
state once the market is legalized (MacCoun 1996). There are also examples of markets 
– alcohol and gambling in the United States – that were once illegal and were legalized. 
Legalization of type 1 or type 2 markets leads to a drop in price when the legal succes-
sor market is organized as a competitive market. However, the state may keep product 
prices high by imposing high taxes on the product (for example, lottery tickets) which 
in turn may lead to the emergence of illegal shadow markets (for example, cigarettes, 
sports betting). 
Competition
The information problems mentioned above not only influence the value and price of 
products traded on illegal markets but also structure competition. Lack of transparency 
of product quality makes the market opaque to customers and reduces the information 
content of prices, which distorts competition. The reduction of competitive pressures 
on suppliers is in part already the result of the structural conditions under which they 
must operate. The conditions lead to fragmented market structures in which competi-
tion is often structured through personal networks with only local expansion. The per-
sonalized structures typical of illegal markets are a far cry from economists’ definition 
of perfect markets but also far from the much less personalized existing legal markets. If 
one assumes, with economic theory, that the efficiency of markets is enhanced through 
competition, illegal markets are structurally inefficient because of their limited ability 
to resolve information problems and their proneness to negative external effects. 
The inability to resolve information problems prevents illegal markets from developing 
more competitive structures. Another impediment to the development of competitive 
market structures is the limitation of competition through the curtailing of vending 
opportunities. In the case of stolen products, sales potential is limited through the diffi-
culties involved in finding customers. Thieves sell their merchandise primarily to fences 
or directly to friends and relatives (Fass/Francis 2004; Stevenson 2001: 108). Thieves 
may also sell to drug dealers because they have the necessary networks to resell the 
goods (Ferrante/Clare 2006). Competition on illegal markets suffers from the inhibi-
tion of marketing activities and the open offering of products. While these structural 
components lead to protection from polypolistic price competition it also hinders mar-
ket development and thereby limits profit opportunities. 
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Although the state is absent as a regulator of competition, early suggestions that in il-
legal markets monopolies tend to form (Schelling 1967) have proven to be incorrect 
(Williams 2001: 68). Most illegal markets are shaped by a network structure instead of 
monopolies (e.g. Zhang 2008). Only in certain narrowly limited areas have criminal 
groups managed to achieve a monopoly. Examples are mafia clans in certain communi-
ties of Southern Italy (Gambetta 1988b: 164; Paoli 2004: 22) and drug gangs in certain 
quarters of Brazilian cities (Zaluar 2000).
The securing of competitive advantages through the exclusion of potential competitors 
from the market (market closure) does not have to be organized by the market supplier 
himself. Instead, the supplier can buy the services of organized crime groups who offer 
“protection” in exchange for a payoff. Protection can involve shielding from new market 
competitors but also access to new customers, for instance through the commissioning 
of public work (Gambetta 1993: 22). The need to pay protection money to organized 
crime groups in order to enter a market can itself be understood as an entry barrier to 
a market (Gambetta 1988a: 134), which reduces competition. The (potentially) violent 
exclusion of competitors from market access on many illegal markets secures profits. 
However, it is also associated with high transaction costs and a welfare loss due to lower 
product quality and higher prices.
Not only private groups can be employed to exclude potential competitors. Frequently, 
criminal actors operate not without or against the state, but actually in cooperation 
with corrupt state agencies or individual state employees. Corrupt state agencies desist 
from law enforcement against the illegal firm in return for a share in the business. Illegal 
entrepreneurs not willing or able to cooperate with corrupt state agencies risk prosecu-
tion. Through corruption the state enhances the stability of illegal markets, at least by 
stabilizing criminals’ expectations with regard to law enforcement (Dewey 2011). The 
state’s participation in illegal activities can go so far that the illegal market is fully con-
trolled or even monopolized by state agencies (Paoli et al. 2007).
Illegal activities can influence competition in yet another form, which does not refer to 
the organization of illegal markets, but to the procurement of competitive advantages 
on legal markets through the mingling of legal and illegal activities. This holds true for 
type 4 markets where legal regulations governing production of a good are violated. 
The illegal disposal of toxic waste allows an otherwise completely legal firm to realize 
cost advantages through the illegal externalization of costs stemming from legal regula-
tion for environmental protection (Massari/Monzini 2004: 293). Such cost reductions 
are competitive advantages (Westra 2004: 309). The same holds true for the use of illicit 
labor, the violation of safety standards or the violation of nature protection standards, 
for instance logging without permission (Tacconi 2007). This provides further evidence 
of the importance of the close interconnectedness of illegal activities and legal markets 
(Brodie/Doole 2001: 2), one of the most interesting topics in the study of the illegal 
economy.
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Cooperation
A further source of uncertainty in market exchange lies in the conditions for coopera-
tion. To what extent can one trust one’s business partners? This is already an impor-
tant problem on markets operating legally due to incomplete information and incom-
plete contracts (Beckert 2005; Gambetta 1988b; Möllering 2006). On illegal markets, 
the magnitude of the problem rises dramatically. Actors involved in illegal activity face 
the danger of being prosecuted for their activities. In the case of child pornography 
(Jenkins 2001), actors proceed with such care that one cannot even call the emerging 
exchange structures a market. Instead, they can be described as forms of barter among 
closed groups where commercial interests recede into the background (Quayle/Taylor 
2002: 345–348). Actors on illegal markets must hide their behavior from state authori-
ties and people who may cooperate with these authorities. At the same time, actors on 
illegal markets need to interact with others to conduct their business, thereby exposing 
themselves to the risk of being detected. Actors on illegal markets need to trust exchange 
partners in many more dimensions than actors conducting legal economic activities. 
At the same time, the means available to them to enforce trust are much more limited; 
they resemble rather pre-modern trust devices than modern ones. While trust in ear-
lier economic configurations was largely anchored in personal relations, today trust 
in the economy is mostly made possible through institutions (Zucker 1986; Giddens 
1990). Institution-based trust allows for the unprecedented time-space distanciation of 
modern economies and is the bedrock of the expansion of market relations. One of the 
most consequential differences between legal and illegal markets is that illegal markets 
are strictly limited in the development of institutional trust. This is because the state 
is absent from the enforcement of contracts and institutional self-regulation on illegal 
markets cannot operate in the open due to the danger of state prosecution.6 
As a result of these structural conditions, exchange on illegal markets is to a much 
greater extent organized within networks. Indeed, all research on illegal markets agrees 
on this point. “Illicit markets may be distinguished from licit markets by their failure 
to adopt impersonal forms or intentional communication and distribution of goods” 
(Arlacchi 1998: 208). Even personal relations, however, are much more demanding to 
organize because the risks are much greater than in legal market transactions. Hence, to 
become a partner in illegal transactions presupposes credible signals of trustworthiness 
on the side of the trust-taker (Gambetta 2009) and intensive monitoring on the side 
of the trust-giver (Spremann 1988: 618). Credible signs can be time served in prison, 
specific tattoos, but also a reputation of reliability from former encounters (Gambetta 
2009: 11). To enter the group, personal, ethnic or family relations are often necessary 
and indeed the organization of illegal markets on the basis of “character trust” (Zucker 
6 An exception to this is when actors operating on illegal markets succeed in “protecting them-
selves” from state prosecution by bribing officials in law enforcement and the judicial system. 
See Dewey (2011) for the case of Buenos Aires. 
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1986) is a very common phenomenon (Kenney 2007a; Nguyen 2004; Lampe/Johansen 
2004). This kind of trust can also be transmitted by intermediaries (Zaitch 2002: 251; 
Kenney 2007b: 28). 
The high stakes involved in the personal relations and the absence of the enforcement 
of contracts through the legal system explain the role of violence – or at least the la-
tent threat of violence – against defectors on illegal markets. Violence is a mechanism 
to enforce cooperation on illegal markets. The credible threat of violent retaliation by 
the trust-giver increases the costs of defection for the trust-taker. Nevertheless, studies 
on illegal markets show that violence is used only reluctantly (Coomber/Maher 2006: 
741; Antonopoulos 2008: 281). While it exists as a background threat, actors attempt to 
avoid the use of violence because of the attention it generates among the public and law 
enforcement authorities. Violence can be observed particularly in phases of challenges 
to established power structures on the market, as can be seen currently, for example, in 
the drug war in Mexico (Snyder/Duran-Martinez 2009). 
The high risks involved in illicit activities and the reduced possibilities for building up 
institutions based on trust lead not only to recourse to violence, at least latently, but 
also inhibit sophistication in the development of illegal markets. The organizational 
structure of “firms” operating in illicit activities provides evidence for this. Organiza-
tions are typically very small and networks are only loosely coupled. Studies on human 
trafficking (Zhang 2008; Subedi 2009) report that the typical “enterprise” consists of no 
more than three to four people. Even on illegal drug markets, organizational structures 
exhibit patterns of very small units or sole traders (Desroches 2005: 123). Often “em-
ployees” are hired only temporarily and as little knowledge as possible is communicated 
within networks concerning operations (Dorn/Oette/White 1998; Natarajan 2000: 291).
The “overembeddedness” (Uzzi 1997) of market transactions in illegal markets inhibits 
efficient organizational size and information flows. They are the cause of severe restric-
tions in the possibilities for enlargement of illegal markets and give them a specific 
premodern flavor. The organization of illegal markets is characterized by the segmental 
differentiation characteristic of pre-state societies (Paul/Schwalb 2011: 135). Market re-
lations are established by individuals who do not occupy a formal position that can eas-
ily be taken over by any other person. Trust is in most cases bound to that person. Only 
under very specific conditions can de-personalized relations develop – for example, be-
tween mafia-style groups with formal membership, where the whole group is hold re-
sponsible for members’ actions. The reliance on personal relations is also strengthened 
by the lack of financial tools commonly used by legal business (Gottschalk 2009: 15). 
Banks and investors are reluctant to lend their money to criminal enterprises, which 
makes it necessary for entrepreneurs to finance their businesses internally or to turn to 
other persons whom they trust personally. 
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4 Investigating illegal markets: Research questions
The previous section has shown how illegal markets can be studied within a framework 
for investigating markets which brings coordination problems to the fore. Existing lit-
erature from criminology, economics, anthropology, and sociology provides insights 
into the operation of illegal markets. This research demonstrates that the challenges to 
be met by actors on illegal markets differ between the respective forms of markets and 
the products being sold. The analysis also shows some common features which are of 
substantial interest for the study of markets in general. 
Despite the importance of the study of illegal markets for market sociology, interest 
in illegal markets is largely absent from economic sociology. In this section, we will 
identify a set of further research questions that are especially important in the study 
of illegal markets from a sociological perspective. These issues can be added to those 
discussed in the previous section relating to the valuation and pricing of products, the 
organization of competition, and the mechanisms through which trust is established 
on illegal markets. 
1. Illegal markets should be studied from a process perspective, investigating their emer-
gence, proliferation, and possible decay. Many conditions which trigger or hinder the 
spread of illegal markets – such as ethnic communities, social values, organizational 
and technological preconditions, or the effectiveness of law enforcement – have been 
identified in existing research. However, their exact role and interrelatedness remain 
unclear. Historical examples of prohibition and/or its suspensions – for example, 
alcohol, prostitution, mind-altering drugs – make possible the investigation of the 
appearance and disappearance of illegal markets and justifications for the outlawing 
of certain market transactions. The role of social norms, justifying the permitting or 
prohibition of markets and the relationship between legality and legitimacy should 
be taken in consideration in this endeavor (cf. Satz 2010). The investigation of newly 
emerging illegal markets, such as those for body parts (Foster 1997) or surrogate 
mothers (Krawiec 2010), allows us to study illegal markets in the making. 
2. A second set of research questions concern the organizational features of illegal 
markets. Although network-shaped organizational styles are predominant, there are 
many different patterns in which production chains are organized. There are lar-
ge differences within market types and, at the same time, similarities across them. 
The theft and sale of small products, which are a common target of petty theft, is 
organized very differently from, say, car theft which requires a comprehensive or-
ganizational structure. While the former involves only thieves and fences (Johns/
Hayes 2003), there are many differentiated roles and sophisticated technical and 
commercial processes in auto theft (Sieber/Bögel 1993: 78–110). The illegal cigarette 
trade (type 4) and illegal drugs trade (type 1), however, may have more in common 
than their different classifications suggest at first sight. Under what circumstances do 
which organizational forms dominate? How are the emerging forms related to the 
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competitive structure and problems of cooperation emerging in the market? These 
questions are even more relevant given the variance of business styles, even in the 
same market: for example, illegal drugs, which range from individual traders and 
networks of loosely coupled individuals (Desroches 2007: 834; Massari 2005: 9) to 
hierarchically organized groups (Curtis 2007: 883). Not only the differences in or-
ganizational structure, but also the functioning of the different forms need further 
clarification. Composition, stability, internal processes, and functions of networks in 
illegal markets should be compared to their counterparts in the legal economy. 
3. A third set of questions concerns the interfaces between legal and illegal markets. 
The very notion of “illegal markets” seems to suggest something strictly separated 
from legal market activity. However, this is often not the case. Already the discussion 
of stolen and counterfeit products (type 3), as well as markets in which an otherwise 
legal product has been produced in violation of legal regulations (type 4), shows the 
close interconnectedness of illegal and legal market activity. The same intermingling 
has been shown for actors on illegal markets who are often active simultaneously in 
both legal and illegal activities. The interfaces between legal and illegal markets can 
be systematized in a typology distinguishing between illegal markets that relate pa-
rasitically or symbiotically to legal markets (Wehinger 2011). In both cases the mar-
ket for the illegal commodity cannot exist without a legal twin. An example is the 
trade in so-called “blood diamonds” which are cut and sold in the same production 
and sales facilities as all other diamonds. But how exactly the boundary crossings 
from the illegal to the legal are organized is unknown. 
4. The state can adopt multiple positions towards illegal markets. It can fight them 
or become their accomplice. The extent to which the state in fact does prosecute 
or should in theory prosecute the actors on illegal markets is not easy to answer 
because of difficulties involved in cost–benefit calculations. This also has to do with 
the incommensurability of the economic and value related consequences of illegal 
markets. The factors which lead to the state’s deciding to allocate a certain propor-
tion of its capabilities to fighting illegal markets are especially likely to include non-
economic, socially founded arguments. No matter what position the state takes, it 
is always an actor in illegal markets to whose activities the other actors must adjust. 
They will try to evade the jurisdiction of the state, influence its actions, exploit it in 
competition with business rivals, and corrupt it. Besides “turning a blind eye” or 
providing a “protective umbrella” for criminal activities, it can also itself actively 
engage in illegal markets (Shen/Antonopoulos/Lampe 2010: 250–251) and even be-
come the main supplier of illegal products and services (Paoli et al. 2007).
 How much the state invests in combating illegal markets and whether it prohibits 
certain forms of market transactions can also be influenced by non-governmental 
organizations. This is the case with regard to the diamond trade. The timber market, 
by contrast, is still strongly affected by illegal logging; lobbying efforts for national 
or international regulation have not yet yielded the intended results (Banks et al. 
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2008: 6–7; Malets 2009). The causes and consequences of the specific interplay bet-
ween illegal markets and states should be researched in diachronic and synchronic 
comparisons. In addition, the extent to which self-regulation is an option for illegal 
markets is an important question. Whether the state takes a negligent or hostile 
stance towards illegal markets, the participants in these markets must rely on their 
own ability to solve the market coordination problems described above. The finding 
regarding self-regulation, however, could also contribute to a better understanding 
of legal markets. 
5. A final set of issues refers to the consequences of illegal markets. The inability of 
the state to eradicate illegal markets can exacerbate social afflictions (illegal drugs, 
prostitution) or impair general trust in state and market institutions. Potentially, the 
very presence of illegal markets can erode the belief that certain illegal activities are 
illegitimate at all and thus undermine social norms by deviating from custom. Illegal 
markets also have economic consequences. The mere existence of illegal markets 
can make consumers insecure with regard to the quality of goods offered to them as 
legal if illegal products capture a larger segment of the legal market. Illegal markets 
can distort competition if they provide competitive advantages based on the evasion 
of regulatory norms. Illegal markets may, however, also have positive consequences: 
The provision of goods which are otherwise unavailable increases individual welfare 
and can contribute to economic growth. In the section on the justification of the 
prohibition of specific market exchanges we alluded to the point that the prohibiti-
on of markets can itself have negative consequences not least due to the emergence 
of illegal markets over which the state cannot exercise any regulatory control. The 
re-legalization of markets for alcohol and gambling in the United States was also a 
reaction to the negative social consequences of the illegal markets that had surfaced 
under prohibition. 
5 Conclusion 
Illegal markets have economic importance and represent an interesting field for socio-
logical research. Economic sociology, however, has not yet taken up this challenge. Re-
search on illegal markets is virtually nonexistent within market sociology.7 The research 
conducted on illegal markets in criminology, anthropology, law, history, and economics, 
on the other hand, finds no connection to economic sociology. Often it is overly em-
pirical, describing a specific illegal market (most prominently, illegal drugs) or illegal 
behavior in legal markets, but with no explicit theoretical anchoring. A promising way 
to study the operation of illegal markets systematically is to proceed from the coor-
7 Alejandro Portes’s (2010) textbook on economic sociology touches on this subject in Chapter 7: 
“The informal economy.”
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dination problems in market exchange and investigate how actors on illegal markets 
respond to these problems and what kind of market structures develop. 
One of the central premises of market sociology is that reproducible role structures 
in exchange relations appear only when uncertainty is reduced so that “stable worlds” 
(Fligstein 2001) can emerge. Reduction of uncertainty is a precondition for making de-
cisions calculable. Market sociology shows the crucial role of formal institutions, social 
networks, and cognitive frames in the stabilization of markets.
In illegal markets, most formal institutions involved in securing property rights are 
beyond reach for the actors concerned, while social relations suffer from a lack of insti-
tutional trust. In addition, cognitive frames are constantly challenged through the turn-
over of actors and non-complicit competition. Furthermore, actors in illegal markets 
are subject to state prosecution, which makes their position even more tenuous. The 
fact that, nevertheless, market structures do emerge seems at first sight to contradict 
the proposition that the reduction of uncertainty is a necessary condition for the emer-
gence of markets. A closer look at the operation of illegal markets, however, shows that 
in most instances these markets develop only deficient structures, compared to legal 
markets, which is why they are not able to achieve the scope and level of efficiency ob-
servable in the latter. Illegal markets rely largely on personal networks and reputation 
to solve coordination problems. This is a liability for these markets and makes them 
appear, in specific ways, un-modern; market relations do not achieve the impersonality 
of exchange and institutional protection of property rights characteristic of exchange 
on contemporary legal markets. The study of illegal markets can thus highlight also in-
directly the importance of institutionally secured structures for the possibility of highly 
complex exchange relations with wide time-space distanciations. 
Illegal markets, however, are not only confronted with the mere absence of formal in-
stitutions regulating exchange; the actors are also subject to state prosecution. This not 
only inhibits the development of complex organizational structures (Paul/Schwalb 
2011), but also establishes an affinity between illegal market activities and weak or cor-
rupt states. When operating undisturbed by legal prosecution, actors participating in 
illegal markets are at an advantage: “Criminal groups come about when the state cannot 
regulate certain markets due to diminished capacity, or when it chooses not to regulate 
markets by declaring certain commodities and services illegal” (Koivu 2007: 4). 
It is strongly desirable that economic sociology turn to the investigation of illegal mar-
kets, giving up one of its most basic implicit premises, namely that the activities on 
markets are legal. This article is intended to be a first step towards shedding light on an 
aspect of markets which, so far, has been confined to the shadows of research in eco-
nomic sociology.
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